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Abstract—Dynamic relationships between Near Field Communic-
ation (NFC) ecosystem players in a monetary transaction make
them partners in a way that they sometimes require to share
access permission to applications that are running in the service
environment. One of the technologies that can be used to ensure
secure NFC transactions is cloud computing. This offers a wider
range of advantages than the use of only a Secure Element (SE)
in an NFC enabled mobile phone. In this paper, we propose
a protocol for NFC mobile payments over NFC using Global
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) authentication. In our
protocol, the SE in the mobile device is used for customer auth-
entication whereas the customer’s banking credentials are stored
in a cloud under the control of the Mobile Network Operator
(MNO). The proposed protocol eliminates the requirement for
a shared secret between the Point of Sale (PoS) and the MNO
before execution of the protocol, a mandatory requirement in
the earlier version of this protocol. This elimination makes the
protocol more practicable and user friendly. A detailed analysis
of the protocol discusses multiple attack scenarios.
Keywords–Near Field Communication; Security; Mobile Trans-
action; Cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
Agreed technical standards and fundamental interoperabil-
ity are essential basics to achieve for industries working with
NFC technology in order to establish positive cooperation
in the service environment. Lack of interoperability in the
complex application level has resulted in the slow adoption of
NFC technology. Current service applications do not provide a
unique solution for the ecosystem: many independent business
players are currently making decisions based too closely on
their own advantage over other players. Consequently, the
service environment does not meet the optimal conditions for
take-up. This has motivated us to extend current NFC ecosys-
tem models to accelerate development. Our goal is to provide
a concept for an NFC ecosystem that is technically feasible,
accepted by all parties involved and provides an improved
business case for each of the players. One of the main players
in the NFC ecosystem is the Mobile Network Operator (MNO).
The advantage an MNO has over other parties is that it owns
a Secure Element (SE), the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
card, that stores and protects the security parameters. Unlike
other forms of SE, the SIM card can be easily managed by the
MNO over-the-air. Thus, we foresee that the MNO will play
a major role in future in the NFC ecosystem.
A. Our Contribution
Here, we extend the earlier proposed mobile transaction
mechanism mentioned in [1]. The major contribution of our
work is the elimination of the requirement for a shared secret
between the Point of Sale (PoS) and the MNO, a prerequisite
in the initially proposed protocol. This makes our work more
flexible and it can even be used for monetary transfer between
two individuals provided that the payer has registered a bank
account with his MNO. We partition the SE into two sections:
one stored in the SIM for authentication of a customer and
the other stored in the cloud to hold cutomer account details.
The authentication of the customer by the MNO is based on a
GSM authenticating mechanism. The GSM standard, although
not so secure, is still widely used for mobile communication,
accounting for more than five billion subscriptions [2]. The
idea is to reuse the existing cryptographic functionalities of the
GSM standard thus reducing a need of additional cryptographic
modules. Our protocol works on a similar pattern to that
of ‘PayPal’: the MNO, acting in the same way as PayPal,
registers multiple banking cards against a user for monetary
transactions. The user then selects a single card at the time of
the payment. But, unlike PayPal, our system uses the existing
features of GSM standard for secure transactions. An overview
of this model was proposed in [3].
This paper is structured as follows: Section II introduces
the SE with a discussion of its management issues. We also
highlight some advantages of having a cloud environment
for mobile payment transactions. Section III describes related
literature while Section IV recalls the essentials of GSM auth-
entication. Then Section V introduces our proposed transaction
protocol in detail followed by its analysis. Finally, Section VII
places our solution in context, summarises how it operates,
and draws some conclusions.
II. MANAGEMENT OF THE SE
The security of NFC is supposed to be provided by a
component called the “security controller” that is in the form of
an SE. The SE is an attack resistant microcontroller that can be
found in a smart card [4]. It provides storage within the mobile
phone and contains hardware, software, protocols and inter-
faces. It provides a secure area for the protection of payment
assets (e.g., keys, payment application code, and payment data)
and the execution of other applications. In addition, the SE
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can be used to store other applications which require security
mechanisms and it is involved in authentication processes. To
be able to handle all these, the installed operating system has
to have the capability of personalizing and managing multiple
applications that are provided by multiple Service Providers,
preferably over-the-air. Still, the ownership and control of the
SE within the NFC ecosystem may result in a commercial
and strategic advantage, as well as reluctance to participate
from other providers. However, some solutions are already
in place [4] and researchers are developing further models to
overcome this problem.
A. Advantages of the Cloud-Based Approach
Our NFC cloud-based approach introduces a new method
of storing, managing and accessing sensitive transaction data
by storing data in the cloud rather than in the mobile phone.
When a transaction is carried out, the required data is retrieved
from a remote virtual SE which is stored within the cloud
environment. The mobile phone SE provides temporary storage
and authentication assets for the transaction to take place, and
all communication between the cloud provider and the vendor
terminal is established through the NFC phone.
An issue with SEs is that companies have to meet the
requirements of organisations such as EMVco [5] to provide
high level security to store personal data. This makes the SE
expensive for companies. However, a cloud-based approach
would transfer this cost. Then the SE in the NFC phone need
only be responsible for user/device authentication and not for
storing personal data. This improves the cost efficiency of the
SE compared with the present, enabling many more secure
applications to be supported because of the reduced space.
Also, the NFC controller chips could be smaller and cheaper
as they no longer have to support all previous functionality.
The NFC cloud-based approach makes business simpler for
companies in terms of the integration of SE card provisioning.
It would be much easier for businesses to implement NFC
services without having to perform card provisioning for every
single SE. The NFC phone user will be able to access many
more applications as they are no longer stored in a physical
SE. In terms of flexibility, all users would be able to access
all their applications from all their devices (e.g., phones,
tablets or laptops) since the applications are stored in a cloud
environment that provides a single, shared, secure, storage
space. Moreover, fraud detection would be instantaneous as
the system runs only in a fully online mode.
III. RELATED WORK
One of the major companies which operates the concept
of a Mobile Wallet is Google, whose name for this service
is “Google Wallet”. The communication between the mobile
phone and the PoS is carried out through NFC technology
that transmits the payment details to the merchant’s PoS.
The Google Wallet is in the form of an Android application
with a Secure Element (SE) on the customer’s mobile phone
and an SE in the cloud. The customer will have an account
with Google Wallet which includes the relevant registered
credit/debit cards whose details are stored in the online SE
using secure servers. The transaction takes place in the form
of a virtual prepaid credit card which is transfered to the
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FIGURE 1. GENERATION OF Kc AND SRES FROM RAND.
merchant’s PoS when the customer taps his phone on the PoS.
For this, the Google Wallet app initializes the SE on the mobile
device and a secure channel is established between the SE of
the device and the SE in the cloud [6].
Our model differs from Google Wallet in the context of the
location of the SE. We use the SIM as the SE in the mobile
device whereas, the Google wallet requires an embedded SE.
If a customer changes his handset, our approach still works
as only the SIM needs to be replaced in the new device. This
makes the approach more flexible.
Gerald Madlmayr and Josef Langer presented a purse-
based micro-payment system [7]. They designed a pre-paid
wallet where the money is stored in the Secure Element in the
mobile device. The user can top-up his account Over-The-Air
(OTA), anywhere and at any time.
Other solutions include “MasterPass” [8]. This service
was developed by MasterCard as an extended version of the
PayPass Wallet Services [9] that provides a digital wallet
service for safe and easy online shopping.
IV. GSM AUTHENTICATION
When a mobile device signs into a network, the MNO
first authenticates the device (specifically the SIM). The
authentication stage verifies the identity and validity of the
SIM and ensures that the subscriber has authorized access to
the network. The Authentication Centre (AuC) of the MNO
is responsible for authenticating each SIM that attempts to
connect to the GSM core network through a Mobile Switching
Centre (MSC). The AuC stores two encryption algorithms, A3
and A8, as well as a list of all subscriber identities along with
their corresponding secret keys Ki. The key Ki is also stored
in the SIM. The AuC first generates a random number, denoted
by RAND. This is used to generate two responses: a signed
response SRES and a key Kc as shown in Figure 1, where
SRES = EKi(RAND) uses the A3 encryption algorithm and
Kc = EKi(RAND) uses the A8 encryption algorithm [10].
(RAND,SRES,Kc) is known as the Authentication
triplet generated by the AuC. The AuC sends this triplet to
the MSC. On receiving a triplet, the MSC forwards RAND
to the mobile device. The SIM computes the expected response
SRES from RAND, using A3 and the keyKi which is stored
in the SIM. The mobile device transmits SRES to the MSC. If
this SRES matches the SRES in the triplet, then the mobile
is authenticated.Kc is then used for communication encryption
between the mobile device and the Base Station (BS).
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TABLE I. ABBREVIATIONS
AccID Account ID of the customer
AppID Transaction approval message for customer account ID
AuC Authentication Center (subsystem of MNO)
BS Base Station
Crreq Credit Request Message
Crapp Credit Approved Message
IMSI Internet Mobile Subscriber Identity
Ki SIM specific key. Stored at a secure location in SIM and at
AuC
Kc EKi (RAND) using A8 algorithm
K1 Encryption key generated by the SIM
K2 MAC key generated by the SIM
K3 Encryption key generated by shop (the PoS)
K4 MAC key generated by shop
Kpub Public key of MTD
Kpr Private key of MTD
Ksign Signing key of MTD
Kver Verification key of MTD
LAI Local Area Identifier
MD Mobile Device
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MSC Mobile Switching Centre
MTD MNO Transaction Department
PI Payment Information
RAND Random Number (128 bits) generated by MNO
Rs Random number generated by SIM (128 bits)
SBAD Shop Bank Account Detail
SE Secure Element
SRES Expected Response
TEMu Transaction Execution Message for user
TEMs Transaction Execution Message for shop
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
TP Total Price
TSID Temporary Shop Identifier
TSa Approval Time Stamp
TSs Shop Time Stamp
TStr Transaction Time Stamp
TSN Transaction Serial Number
V. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL
This section describes our proposed protocol for micro-
payments based on NFC and cloud architecture. The assump-
tions are outlined as follows:
Our proposal is based on a cloud architecture where the
cloud is being managed by the MNO. The cloud is used to
store sensitive information about customers. A customer, who
is a user of a cell phone, opens up a payment account with the
respective MNO prior to use of the proposed payment feature.
Each account is identified by a unique identity, the Account
ID or AccID. The account is either a pre-paid or a pay-as-
you-go account. In the former type of account, the customer
needs to top-up his account by either pre-paid vouchers or
cash. This feature is more suitable for customers who do not
have bank accounts. The amount a customer has in his pre-
paid account is stored in the cloud against respective AccID. In
the pay-as-you-go type of account, the customer provides his
banking credentials, like credit/debit card details to the MNO.
The banking credentials are verified in the registration process
by the MNO from respective bank and are stored against the
respective AccID in the cloud. A customer can have one or
more accounts of either type and has the option to select one
account while payment.
We suggest a dedicated department, the MNO Transaction
Department (MTD), to manage the monetary transactions. A
virtual secure tunnel is established between the mobile device
and the MTD to ensure the security of the messages. The
virtual tunnel is of special significance when the BS of some
other network is used for the transaction as, in such scenario,
the MNO responsible for monetary transaction does not want
to reveal any sensitive information to the BS.
The mobile device communicates with the MNO over
the standard GSM link. Communication over the GSM link
between the mobile device and the BS is encrypted as specified
in the GSM standard. Otherwise, communication between
different entities of the GSM network is not considered to be
secure and so encryption needs to be added where appropriate.
The MNO may be linked to the customer through its
own BS or through a BS of some other network. Especially
in the latter case, the proposed protocol should not disclose
any sensitive information to the other network. The shop
communicates with the MNO through the customer’s mobile
device using NFC and the GSM link. The shop PoS terminal
does not require to be registered with the MNO. This makes
the protocol more flexible and can also be used for monetary
transactions between two individuals (the payer and the payee
are analogous to the customer and the shop respectively).
The mobile device is connected to the shop terminal over
an NFC link, but note that, although the NFC link is generally
regarded as secure because of its short range of operation, yet it
can be eavesdropped [11] or vulnerable to relay attacks [12]. A
recent study suggested that any metallic object in the vicinity
of an NFC link, even a shopping trolley, can act as ‘rogue’
antenna to eavesdrop the communication [13].
The shop does not use any direct link with the MTD
for transactions. However, it needs to trust the MTD, i.e., a
message digitally signed by it should be considered authentic
and its contents trusted.
For simplicity, we refer to the mobile device and SIM as
a single unit called the ‘Mobile Device’ (MD). Ksign,Kver
are the signing and verification keys respectively of the MTD,
whereas Kpr,Kpub are the private decryption and public
encryption keys respectively of the MTD.
Before any transaction can take place, the customer must
have registered at least one account with his MTD and the
merchant must have downloaded an (MNO-independent) appli-
cation for performing our protocol. The merchant’s application
must be able to form several messages, such as PI (detailed
below), in a format acceptable to the MTD of any MNO.
In addition, the merchant needs to obtain and store trusted
certificates for the keys of the MTDs he is willing to trust.
The protocol executes in three different phases: customer
identification and credit check, customer authentication, and
transaction execution. The steps of the protocol are illustrated
in Figure 2, with numbering as in the text. Table I describes
the abbreviations used in the proposed protocol.
A. Phase I: Customer Identification and Credit Check
This phase is initiated when the store owner sends the
payment request to his NFC reader and the customer places
his MD on the shop’s NFC enabled point.
Step 1: The MD and shop terminal establish an NFC
connection.
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MTD MSC/AuC BS SIM/MD Shop
MNO
Link
Network GSM Link NFC Link
3.1 PIN Verification
3.2 User Account Selection
3.3 K1, K2 Generation
5.1 Customer Identification
from IMSI
5.2 Credit Check
10. Verify Response S
13.1 Decrypt with K1
13.2 Signature Verification
15.1 Signature Verification
15.2 K3, K4 Generation
17. Transaction Execution
20.1 Signature Verification
20.2 Message Verification
21.1 Signature Verification
21.2 Message Verification
1. PI Request
2. PI
4. EKpub (K1‖K2), EK1 (Crreq),MACK2 [EK1 (Crreq)]
6. Auth req, IMSI
7. Authentication Triplet
8. R
9. S
11. Authentication Success
12. EK1 (Crapp), Sig
14. Crapp, Sig
16. EKpub (Kinfo), EK3 (Banking Details), MACK4 [EK3 (Banking Details)]
18. EK1 (TEMu), Sig
19. EK3 (TEMs), Sig
FIGURE 2. THE PROPOSED CUSTOMER AUTHENTICATION & PAYMENT PROTOCOL
Step 2: The shop terminal forms the Payment Information
message PI containing at least the Total Price TP , a temporary
shop identity TSID, and the shop’s Time Stamp TSs, and sends
it to the MD:
PI = TP‖TSID‖TSs (1)
The TSID acts as one time identifier used by the shop
to identify the transaction. It is updated and fresh for each
transaction. Optionally, PI may also contain a description of
the shop and the goods which would appear on the customer’s
credit/debit card account statement.
Steps 3-4: Once the payment information is received from
the shop, the application installed on the MD displays the
transaction amount TP to the user and asks him to select a
payment account and provide PIN authentication. This is for
assurance that the customer is the legal owner of the mobile
device, and therefore also the owner of the account which will
be used for payment. It also provides confirmation that the
amount and account details are accepted by the user.
After successful PIN verification, the mobile device needs
to obtain a credit approval certificate for the shop from the
respective MTD indicating that the customer has sufficient
funds in his account and has agreed to pay the required amount.
The information in this exchange should not be accessible
to the BS or any other entity of GSM network other than
the MTD. To provide a secure connection for this exchange
between the MD and the MTD, the former generates two keys
K1,K2 for symmetric encryption and MAC respectively. The
actual encryption process used here is irrelevant, but will most
likely be specified by the card provider and EMV requirements.
It should not depend only on quantities known to either the BS
or the MNO since only the MTD should be able to perform the
decryption. The mobile device forms a credit request message
Crreq for credit approval from the MTD, namely,
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Crreq = PI‖IMSI‖AccID (2)
This is encrypted with K1 and a MAC is computed on
the ciphertext using K2 to provide data integrity. Then the
keys, K1 and K2, are encrypted with the MTD’s public key
Kpub. The entire message, consisting of the encrypted keys,
the encrypted credit request and the MAC value, is sent to the
MTD as in message 4 of Figure 2.
Step 5: Upon receipt of this message, the MTD starts by
decrypting the first part of the message with its private key
Kpr to extract the encryption and MAC keys, K1 and K2. It
then verifies the MAC and in case of successful verification, it
decrypts the second part of the message, containing Crreq , and
checks the freshness of the shop’s time stamp in PI . The MTD
identifies the customer from the IMSI in Crreq and performs
a credit check against the named account AccID.
B. Phase II: Customer Authentication
Steps 6-11: Whether or not the credit and freshness checks
are successful, the MTD sends an authentication request mes-
sage to the MSC/AuC to authenticate the MD. The MD has
already been identified by its IMSI. However, since the IMSI
is not a secret, it may be used by a malicious party. To counter
such threat, the MD needs to be authenticated under the IMSI
claimed in Crreq prior to any monetary transaction. With this
IMSI, the MSC follows the usual procedure to authenticate an
MD and it does not required further user interaction. So, in the
case of successful authentication, the usual success message is
sent from the BS to the MTD.
Step 12: If the credit check fails or the authentication
success message is not received, the protocol is terminated
with the sending of a fail message from the MTD to the MD.
Termination does not occur before the authentication in order
to hide the result of the credit check from an unauthenticated
attacker. Otherwise, when both the credit check and the auth-
entication are successful, a credit approval identifier AppID
is generated by the MTD. This acts as an index to a table in
which the MTD stores information about the debit account,
the amount to be transferred, the destination shop identity, a
time stamp and the MD identity (IMSI). This identifier helps
in resolving any disputes in the future but the details of the
transaction are not contained therein.
The MTD now forms a new string Crapp indicating credit
approval for the Payment Information PI , namely,
Crapp = PI‖TSa‖AppID (3)
The MTD computes a signature with its signing key Ksign
over the hashed plaintext and encrypts the string Crapp with
the key K1. The encrypted Crapp along with its signature
is transmitted to the mobile device. The former cannot be
decrypted in transit as the encryption key K1 is unavailable,
nor is Crapp revealed by applying the verification key to the
signature because of the hashing. Moreover, because of TSs,
TSa or AppID, the message differs each time even if the user
buys the same goods on successive occasions.
Steps 13-16: The mobile device decrypts the message with
the encryption key K1 to obtain Crapp and forwards it to the
shop along with the corresponding signature. The shop verifies
the signature using Kver and compares the PI content in the
Crapp message to the one it initially sent in message 2. In the
case of an invalid signature or a mis-match with PI , the shop
discards the message, rejects the payment, and withholds the
goods or services from the customer. A successful verification
indicates that the customer is legitimate and that the MTD has
obtained agreement from the customer to pay. This is like a
three party contract where a middle party (the MTD), trusted
by both other parties, provides assurance that the other party
is willing to pay the specified price.
The shop now needs to send its banking details to the MTD
to complete the transaction. The banking details may include
the account name and number, the bank and branch codes,
etc. This is sensitive information and should not be disclosed
to any entity other than the MTD, not even to the MD. The
shop therefore generates encryption and MAC keys, K3 and
K4 to secure its banking details. It encrypts the banking details
with the key K3, and computes a MAC over the ciphertext
with the key K4. It also form a string, Kinfo, containing the
information about the keys as follows:
Kinfo = K3‖K4‖AppID (4)
The role of the approval identifier AppID in this step is
to enable the MTD to connect the authentication phase to
the transaction execution phase. The shop encrypts the string
Kinfo with the public key Kpub of the MTD and sends it to
the MTD via the MD. This forms a virtual tunnel between the
shop and the MTD through the MD, as the latter cannot decrypt
the message content. Note, however, that the shop needs to be
certain it has Kpub correctly from the MTD, and not a key
substituted by an attacker.
C. Phase III: Transaction Execution
Step 17: The MTD associates the AppID received in the
step 16 with the already stored AppID (step 12). It decrypts the
banking details of the shop with keys K3, K4 and transfers the
approved amount, stored against corresponding AppID, to the
shop account. The MTD flags the AppID indicating that the
transaction has been executed to ensure that the same AppID
could not be used again.
Step 18-21 After a successful transaction, the MTD gener-
ates a Transaction Serial Number (TSN) and forms Transaction
Execution Messages, TEMu and TEMs for the MD and the
shop respectively.
TEMu = PI‖TSN‖TStr‖AccID
TEMs = PI‖TSN‖TStr‖SBAD
(5)
The MTD computes a signature on the hashed plaintext,
encrypts TEMu with the key K1, and sends it to the MD.
The MD decrypts the message and verifies the signature. An
invalid signature indicates that the transaction confirmation
has been accidentally or deliberately corrupted en route. In
such a case, the MD enquires about the transaction from the
MTD. If the transaction has already been executed, the MD
asks for a fresh confirmation message. Otherwise, it is obvious
that message 16 has not been delivered to the MTD. This
may happen if a malicious party has blocked the message
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from reaching the MTD and has instead transmitted a fake
transaction confirmation message. Of course, such a fabricated
message cannot go undetected as it is signed by the MTD. In
such scenario, the MD asks the shop to resend message 16.
The MTD also forms TEMs for the shop by appending
the Shop’s Banking Details as shown in Eq (5). The MTD
computes a signature over the hashed plaintext and encrypts
TEMs with the key K3. The MTD sends this encrypted
message along with its signature to the customer MD which
relays it to the shop. The customer’s MD can neither decrypt
this message as it does not possess K3, nor alter any contents
as they are protected by the signature. The shop decrypts
the message, verify its contents and the signature, thereby
confirming that his account (rather than an attacker’s) has been
credited correctly. The contents consist of important transac-
tion information exchanged during the transaction. Hence, if
the shop wants any subsequent clarification, it can approach
the MNO quoting the TSN and the AppID received in step 14.
Finally, if the shop is satisfied, it produces a receipt together
with the goods or services for the customer.
VI. ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the protocol from multiple
perspectives to ascertain the strength of our protocol. This
analysis encompasses the authentication and security of the
messages. We assume that the MNO is trustworthy, whereas
the customer or the shop can be dishonest, and there may be an
active attacker listening to any of the NFC or other messages.
A. Dishonest Customer
Scenario 1. A dishonest customer plans to buy some
products, making the payment from someone else’s account.
The PIN requirement in step 3 should force the customer to
use his own mobile device to enact the protocol. Indeed the
protocol depends on the strength of this PIN, just as is the case
with credit card withdrawals. However, rogue applications on
the MD could have already sniffed the PIN.
Assume that the attacker uses his own mobile and knows
the IMSI and account numbers (IMSI ′, Acc′ID) of the target
victim. He must fabricate Eq (2) as:
Cr′req = PI‖IMSI
′‖Acc′ID (6)
As this message can be decrypted only by the MTD, the
malicious contents remain undetected by all other entities. The
MTD decrypts the message and identifies the customer from
IMSI ′. Assuming the protocol does not fail here because the
target victim is not a legitimate customer or the account has in-
sufficient funds, the MTD proceeds to the fresh authentication
of IMSI ′. So the MSC/AuC provides the authentication triplet
in step 7 corresponding to IMSI ′. However, the attacker
cannot compute the valid response S′ as his mobile device
lacks the necessary key K ′i. So, the authentication check fails
and the protocol terminates. Thus, an incorrect identity cannot
be successfully used in the protocol.
Scenario 2. Suppose a dishonest customer plans to buy
goods without payment. He could accomplish this by providing
his own banking details, instead of the shop’s, to the MTD for
the payment recipient. He then blocks the legitimate message
16, and replaces it as follows. Using his own keys K ′3 and K
′
4,
he fabricates message 16 with own banking details and sends
it to the MTD. The MTD performs the transaction against
this information, deducting the amount from the customer’s
account but paying it back into the same or another account
of the customer. (These may be distinct in an attempt to avoid
detection). After executing the transaction, the MTD sends
‘receipts’ in messages 18 and 19. The MD must block message
19 as this message contains the substituted bank details which
the shop checks. So the dishonest customer needs to replace the
banking details in this message with the shop’s banking details.
He can decrypt message 19 as it is encrypted with his own
malicious key K ′3. However, he must now change the banking
details and encrypt them with the shop’s key K3. As he lacks
this key, he cannot generate a valid ciphertext. Moreover, the
original message is protected by the digital signature. If the
customer were to make any alteration to the banking details,
it would void the signature which the shop verifies next. In
neither case is the shop able to verify the transaction and
a failure message is reported to the shopkeeper. Hence, the
dishonest customer is again unsuccessful.
There may be another approach to accomplish the above
attack where the dishonest customer plans to buy some goods
without payment. The dishonest customer does not commun-
icate with the MTD since he could not succeed in the way
described above; rather, he masquerades as the MTD to the
shop. The target of the customer is to send fake but acceptable
receipts to the shop at the end of the protocol by replaying old
legitimate, messages or fabricating new messages. Since the
customer is not communicating with the MTD, his account will
not be debited. In the original protocol, the shop receives three
messages from the MD: messages 1, 14 and 19. Message 1
originates from the MD, whereas messages 14 and 19 actually
originate from the MTD but are relayed by the MD to the
shop. The dishonest customer needs to construct or replay the
latter two messages in such a way that they are acceptable
to the shop. Both messages are digitally signed by the MTD.
They contain the Shop Identitifier TSID and Time Stamp TSs.
TSID is a random value generated by the shop every time at
the start of the protocol. This value not only serves as a shop
identifier during the protocol, but it also adds freshness to the
protocol messages. TSs is updated too in every protocol round,
but it may be predictable to some extent. A combination of
these two values, along with the digital signatures of the MTD,
does not allow either replay or alteration of the messages to
succeed. Hence, the dishonest customer is again unsuccessful.
Of course, as usual in PKI, the shop should check the digital
certificates of the MTD keys to justify its trust in them.
Scenario 3. Assume now that the dishonest customer plans
to pay less than the required amount but claim payment of the
full amount. To accomplish this, the MD sends TP ′ in the
Credit Request message Crreq of step 4 to the MTD, where
TP ′<TP . The MD receives the Credit Approval message,
Crapp, in step 12 from the MTD confirming that the initially
requested amount TP ′ has been approved for transaction. But
the MD needs to confirm to the shop in step 14 that the original
amount, TP , is approved for transaction. Since the approved
price is digitally signed by the MTD, it cannot be amended
by the MD. So the actual price that is approved by the MTD
is transmitted to the shop. As the shop application checks the
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approved amount against that requested, this attack also fails.
Scenario 4. Here, a dishonest customer wants to pay
through a mobile device which he does not own. He might
have stolen that device or found it as lost property. If the
SIM is still valid and the credit/debit cards have not been
cancelled, it can still be used for transactions. After the device
receives the payment information PI from the shop in step
2, the application installed on the mobile device requires PIN
verification from the customer. Since the customer does not
own the mobile device, he should not have knowledge of the
PIN. So the protocol does not proceed further. Additionally,
the application can be designed to be blocked in the MD and
by the MTD after a limited number of failed attempts at PIN
verification. This provides an assurance to the customers that
their lost mobile device could not be used for any monetary
transactions even while the SIM remains active.
B. A Dishonest Shop
Scenario 5. The shop is dishonest and plans to draw more
than the required amount without intimation to the customer.
The information about the amount to be transferred is sent to
the MTD by the MD in the Credit Request message, Crreq ,
in step 4. A mobile device cannot send more than the price
contained in PI and approved by the user in step 3 unless the
device itself is compromised. Therefore, a shop cannot obtain
more than the agreed amount if, as requested, the customer
checks the amount before entering his PIN.
Scenario 6. The shop is dishonest and denies receipt of the
transaction execution message in step 19. In this way, the shop
decides not to deliver the goods or services despite receiving
the required amount. However, the MD has the signed receipt
from the MTD with the TSN from Eq (5). This is linked to
the approval AppID generated in step 12. As both are digitally
signed by the MTD, the customer can approach the MTD
regarding any dispute. With knowledge of the account credited
during the transaction and the shop receipt from the customer,
the MTD can take action to identify the criminal and refund
the customer.
C. Message Security
Apart from the above-mentioned scenarios, we also ana-
lyzed our protocols from various other angles. The data over
the GSM link (between the MD and the BS) is encrypted
according to the GSM specification. The data sent over the
NFC link in steps 1, 2 and 14 are sent in the clear. This
data does not contain any particularly sensitive information
except perhaps for the TP. However, the range within which
this data can be captured is very limited, and it is occupied by
the shop keeper and the customer, at least one of whom should
notice unwelcome devices (such as other NFC capable mobile
phones) in the vicinity. The read range of the price displayed
on both the shop till and the user’s MD is much more than
the range of the NFC link. Therefore, we considered PI as
not sufficiently sensitive to need protection over the NFC link.
Nevertheless, we should consider this in a little more detail.
Other information that is sent in clear over the NFC link
includes the AppID in the Crapp message. At this point the at-
tacker can hi-jack the protocol by blocking the communication
of message 16, replacing it with his own forged message which
contains his own bank details. There is no relevant data which
is not known to the attacker. This results in a successful transfer
of funds to the criminal and also a successful acknowledgment
in step 18 to the legitimate customer. However, the shop owner
will either not receive the transfer message in step 20, or will
receive one which fails his verification. Thus, although the
shop keeper will not then release the goods, the attacker will
have obtained the funds. The solution is to include a means
for the MTD to verify that message 18 comes from the same
source as message 2.
We therefore propose the inclusion of a Diffie-Hellman key
agreement (DH) between the MD and Shop during messages
1 & 2 in situations where the NFC link may be compromised.
Then step 18 can include a proof of origin. Step 1 would
include the public parameters for DH, and the MD’s exponen-
tiated value, while step 2 would include the shop’s response
of the other DH exponentiated value. As message 16 contains
a MAC of the other components of message 16 using the DH
shared key, the MD can check the authenticity of message 16,
ensuring that the protocol has not been hi-jacked. However,
an attacker who can hi-jack the protocol at step 18 could
equally easily hi-jack it at step 1. This requires blocking the
legitimate message PI and replacing it as necessary with PI ′
so that the MD agrees a shared key with the attacker instead
of the shop and, later, the forged message 16 is authenticated
by the MD. Since TP is not known to the attacker until PI
is transmitted, the attacker needs to collect the legitimate PI
first in order to include TP in PI ′, this being necessary to
obtain the customer’s agreement over the price. However, for
this to succeed, the attacker must prevent the correct PI from
reaching the MD. Consequently, the success of Diffie-Hellman
key exchange between shop and MD cannot be prevented
unless the attacker can guess TP correctly or the customer fails
to check the amount carefully. An attacker may use a hidden
camera which can read the shop’s till display, then his NFC
hi-jack device can know TP in advance and so determine a
value for PI which the customer will accept. He can therefore
block the legitimate message 2 and replace it with his own. The
threat from this is similar to that of a camera capturing PIN
values. Payment Card Industry Security Standard Council (PCI
SSC) prohibits use of cameras near a PIN entering device to
avoid monitoring of displays, PIN pads, etc., [14]. Moreover,
there are two methods to block RF communication on the NFC
link and neither of the methods can easily be adopted in our
scenario. The first is to cover the transmitter or receiver with
some shielding material. The other method is to produce a high
noise on the same operating frequency resulting in a significant
decrease in the signal-to-noise ratio. For the former the attacker
must shield the MD or the shop terminal. The latter requires
noise generating hardware in close proximity to the MD and
the shop sales terminal. Both approaches are visibly detectable.
This means there is little scope for a successful attack when
the MD also verifies the authenticity of message 16. It should
therefore be an acceptably small risk.
AppID, which is sent in the clear over the NFC link, is a
random string generated by the credit approval authority. From
an attacker’s perspective, its only significance is its assurance
that the customer had, at least before the transaction, the
amount TP in his account. This assurance can also be achieved
if a customer successfully pays for some goods. Therefore,
AppID is not sensitive information in this scenario.
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The Role of the Approval Identifier in message 16. AppID
acts as a bridge between phase II and III. It also adds
freshness to message 16, so it cannot be replayed in future.
Any alteration in the Kinfo results in invalid keys and an
invalid AppID. Hence it is detectable.
Non-repudiation of Transaction Execution Messages.
TEMu and TEMs are digitally signed by the MTD. In case
of any dispute over payment, the MTD has to honour both
messages. So, both the customer and the shop are completely
assured of the transaction payment taking place.
Disclosure of Relevant Information. The Crreq containing
price information is not disclosed to the base station or any
other GSM entity apart from the MTD. The SBAD is sensitive
information. It is encrypted not only over the GSM links
but also over the NFC link. It is transmitted through the
mobile device to the MTD, yet the former cannot decrypt
this information. The AccID of the customer is not disclosed
to the shop. The MNO does not need to know the shopping
details of the customer. Therefore, only the total amount is
communicated to the MNO for transaction.
New Keys for every Transaction. The encryption and MAC
keys for the message Crreq , namely K1 and K2, are freshly
generated by the mobile device in each round. Similarly,
the keys K3 and K4, generated by the shop, are fresh for
each transaction. Of course, these should not be predictable,
especially if previous such keys become known.
Encryption and MAC Keys. Separate keys are used for
encryption and MAC calculation making the protocol more
secure. Encrypt-then-MAC is an approach where the ciphertext
is generated by encrypting the plaintext and then append-
ing a MAC of the encrypted plaintext. This approach is
cryptographically more secure than other approaches [15].
Apart from its cryptographic value, the MAC can be verified
without performing decryption. So, if the MAC is invalid for
a message, the message is discarded without decryption. This
results in computational efficiency.
D. Monetary Transaction Between Two Individuals
The proposed protocol can be used for monetary trans-
actions between two individuals. The payee acts as a shop
PoS terminal, and uses his own mobile phone for this. The
added advantage in our proposal is that the payee does not
need to register himself with the payer’s (= customer’s) MNO.
This eliminates dependency of both parties to be on the same
mobile network for monetary transactions. The payee needs
only to provide his banking details in step 16 of the protocol.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a transaction protocol
for providing a secure and trusted communication channel for
payment of goods using mobile devices. The proposed protocol
was based on the NFC Cloud Wallet model [16] and the NFC
payment application [1] on secure cloud-based NFC transac-
tions. We considered a cloud-based approach for managing
sensitive data, ensuring the security of NFC transactions by
means of a virtual SE within the cloud environment, as well
as considering and simplifying the role of the physical SE
within the NFC phone architecture. The operations performed
by the vendor’s reader, by an NFC enabled phone and by the
cloud provider (in this paper the MNO) are detailed. Such
operations are possible using current technology as most of the
functionality is already implemented to support other mecha-
nisms. We considered the detailed execution of the protocol
and showed our protocol performs reliably and securely in a
cloud-based NFC transaction architecture. The main advantage
of this paper is to demonstrate another payment method for
those who do not have bank accounts in the normal sense.
This way of making payments eases the process of purchasing
as participants only have to top up their MNO account without
having to follow all the usual banking procedures.
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